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Chemetco further argued that its sentence violated the rule
announced by the Supreme Court in Apprendi. In that case, the
Supreme Court held any fact that increased the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum had to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Chemetco claimed the CWA had a statutory
maximum penalty: $50,000 per day of violation. The court held that
even if Chemetco's argument was taken as true, it would not mandate
a reversal because an Apprendi violation only occurred when the
imposed sentence exceeded the prescribed statutory maximum.
Chemetco had urged the district court to find seventy-one days of
violation, which would yield a fine range of $342,500 to $3,425,000.
The court's fine of $3,327,500 was less than what Chemetco contended
was appropriate. The court of appeals concluded, therefore, even if
the CWA had a statutory maximum penalty, the district court's fine did
not exceed the limit ($3,425,000) in the present case. Accordingly,
the court of appeals affirmed Chemetco's sentence.
GloriaM. Soto

NINTH CIRCUIT
Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
Environmental Protection Agency's refusal to take action against
alleged violations of the Clean Water Act was discretionary and not
subject to judicial review).
The Sierra Club and an individual citizen (collectively "Sierra
Club") sued the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), Christine Todd Whitman ("Whitman"), and others
for failing to take action against the operators of a wastewater
treatment plant allegedly polluting the Santa Cruz River in violation of
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The CWA authorizes any citizen to sue
the Administrator of the EPA for failure to perform any act or duty
deemed "not discretionary" under the act.
The treatment plant ("Plant"), located in Southern Arizona, served
a relatively small population of Americans and Mexicans, and had a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit
that expired in 1996. The Plant continued to operate and discharge
pollutants thereafter while a new NPDES permit was on appeal.
According to the lower court's findings from January 1995 to 2000, the
facility violated its permit limitations 128 times.
The Sierra Club based its suit on the theory that the CWA required
Whitman to find a violation and file suit against the Plant. It focused
on language in the CWA that provides, whenever "the Administrator
finds that any person is in violation" of permit conditions, the
Administrator "shall issue an order requiring such person to comply...
or... shall bring a civil action." The court pointed out the language
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did not compel Whitman to find a violation, and Congress likely used
the word shall as instructive rather than compulsory language.
The court criticized the Sierra Club's argument on three fronts.
First, the court upheld the presumption that an agency's refusal to
investigate or enforce statutory violations lies within that agency's
discretion. Next, it reasoned the agency's limited resources, and the
high number of potential investigations it could face, forced the
Administrator to balance priorities and act only on serious violations.
Finally, the court determined Whitman's decision not to take
enforcement measure was of the type "typically committed to the
agency's absolute discretion." Therefore, the court held "[when] used
in a statute that prospectively affects government action" such as the
CWA, the word shall sometimes carried only the connotations of the
word "may," and did not mandate action.
In further justification of its ruling, the court noted the CWA's
provision allowing citizens to file their own suits against polluters
suggested no congressional intention to mandate government action
for every alleged violation. The court also scrutinized the legislative
history of the CWA for any indicia of a congressional intent to
mandate EPA action via the act, but found no compelling evidence to
suggest this. Accordingly, the court deemed the Sierra Club's claim
outside the scope of judicial review and dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Daniel C. Wennogle

Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States EPA, 279 F.3d 1180 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency erred
by not providing the public with notice of or the opportunity to
comment on changes included in final permits to release bark and
woody debris into marine waters when those changes were not a
logical outgrowth of the draft permits).
The Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") brought this
action against the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for
failing to provide the public with notice of and the opportunity to
comment on changes the EPA approved in two final National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits.
The permits
authorized Alaskan logging transfer facilities ("LTFs") to discharge
bark and woody debris into marine waters. NRDC asserted that
interested parties could not have reasonably anticipated the changes
EPA approved in the final permits. The EPA claimed references
within the draft permits were sufficient to put interested parties on
notice of the changes.
The Alaskan timber industry transports most of its logs to markets
through marine waters. During transportation, friction between logs,
water, and the bottom of the water body causes the discharge of bark
and woody debris. The debris, which can accumulate in significant

